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a b s t r a c t
Despite optimism about the end of AIDS, the HIV response requires sustained ﬁnancing into the future.
Given ﬂat-lining international aid, countries' willingness and ability to shoulder this responsibility will
be central to access to HIV care. This paper examines the potential to expand public HIV ﬁnancing, and
the extent to which governments have been utilising these options.
We develop and compare a normative and empirical approach. First, with data from the 14 most HIV-
affected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we estimate the potential increase in public HIV ﬁnancing from
economic growth, increased general revenue generation, greater health and HIV prioritisation, as well as
from more unconventional and innovative sources, including borrowing, health-earmarked resources,
efﬁciency gains, and complementary non-HIV investments. We then adopt a novel empirical approach to
explore which options are most likely to translate into tangible public ﬁnancing, based on cross-sectional
econometric analyses of 92 low and middle-income country governments' most recent HIV expenditure
between 2008 and 2012.
If all ﬁscal sources were simultaneously leveraged in the next ﬁve years, public HIV spending in these
14 countries could increase from US$3.04 to US$10.84 billion per year. This could cover resource re-
quirements in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Kenya, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Swaziland, but not even
half the requirements in the remaining countries. Our empirical results suggest that, in reality, even less
ﬁscal space could be created (a reduction by over half) and only from more conventional sources. In-
ternational ﬁnancing may also crowd in public ﬁnancing.
Most HIV-affected lower-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to generate sufﬁcient
public resources for HIV in the medium-term, even if they take very bold measures. Considerable in-
ternational ﬁnancing will be required for years to come. HIV funders will need to engage with broader
health and development ﬁnancing to improve government revenue-raising and efﬁciencies.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Despite optimism about the end of AIDS, and remarkable
progress towards this ambition, a sustained HIV response will be
required for years to come. HIV remains the ﬁfth global cause of
morbidity and mortality, and ranks second in sub-Saharan Africa
(Murray et al., 2012). Unprecedented resources have been
mobilised in response to the epidemic, reaching US$19.1 billion in
2013 in lowandmiddle-income countries. Yet, this still falls short of
UNAIDS0 previous resource needs estimates of US$22e24 billion by
2015 and its US$36 billion estimate for 2020 in the ambitious ‘fast-
track’ scenario that would seek to reduce the number of new in-
fections and AIDS-related deaths by 90% by 2030 (UNAIDS, 2014a).
With the success of antiretroviral therapy (ART), HIV infection is
no longer a death sentence, and national governments face the
challenge of how to sustain their growing obligations and duty to
maintain people on life-long treatment (Lule and Haacker, 2012),
alongside laudable commitments to continue scaling up treatment* Corresponding author.
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access for all those who are HIV-infected (UNAIDS, 2014a), and the
need to continue investing in HIV prevention to reduce the rate of
new infections. This challenge is substantial. A recent paper esti-
mates the ﬁscal consequences of this moral duty to treat (Collier
et al., 2015). The ﬁgures are stark. In a scenario where 81% of
people living with HIVwith CD4 counts below 350mm3 are on ART,
the ﬁscal obligations of treatment alone until 2050 have been
conservatively estimated at 21% of current Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) for South Africa, and 80% of current GDP for Malawi, among
others (Collier et al., 2015). The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
sets the ‘sound’ threshold for the debt burden of countries at 40% of
GDP, and therefore this hidden HIV-obligation is potentially of real
economic concern for both governments and donors. Some now
argue that HIV is a ﬁscal as well as a public health crisis, particularly
in sub-Saharan Africa (Collier et al., 2015; Vassall et al., 2013).
To date, much of the HIV response across the region has
depended on international ﬁnancing: only 10%e22% of HIV ex-
penditures in 2013 were ﬁnanced from domestic sources in low-
income and lower-middle-income countries respectively
(UNAIDS, 2014a). However, with the ﬂat-lining of external HIV
funding commitments, optimistic economic growth forecasts and
the prospects of increased revenues from natural resources (Vassall
et al., 2013), several global and regional declarations have called for
African governments to fund more of their own responses (Buse
and Martin, 2012; Galarraga et al., 2013; Resch et al., 2015). This,
it is argued, would allow donors to refocus their resources on
countries that most need external support (Resch et al., 2015). In
addition, there is a growing promotion of ‘innovative ﬁnancing’
mechanisms e such as earmarked taxes or diaspora bonds (Atun
et al., 2012; Katz et al., 2014b) e to create new sources of HIV
ﬁnancing. A withdrawal or re-allocation of donor ﬁnancing,
without a compensating domestic ﬁnancing response, may affect
the continuity of care for those on treatment, and/or have high
opportunity costs by removing ﬁnancing from other critical areas of
domestic spending both within or beyond the health sector. Para-
doxically, some of these other areas of spending may also be
fundamental to the effectiveness of the HIV response, such as ed-
ucation or the strengthening of health systems (McIntyre and
Meheus, 2014; Seeley et al., 2012). It is therefore important to un-
derstand the factors that inﬂuence countries' potential ability to
sustainably fund their national HIV response, without negatively
impacting on spending in other critical areas or undermining
macroeconomic conditions.
Previous investigations into the amount of domestic ﬁnancing
available for the HIV response have not been comprehensive or
formally adjusted for past patterns of ﬁnancing. These analysesmay
have been overly simplistic; providing a partial understanding of
the overall potential ﬁnancing available. Some have analysed the
determinants of domestic ﬁnancing for HIV or the potential of
speciﬁc ﬁnancing sources (Avila et al., 2013; David, 2009; Galarraga
et al., 2013; Katz et al., 2014b; Resch et al., 2015; van der Gaag et al.,
2009; Zeng et al., 2012). However, none of these studies considered
options under all of the potential sources for generating new re-
sources (revenue mobilisation); sharing existing resources differ-
ently (reallocation); and spending existing resources better
(efﬁciency gains). Previous analyses have only considered spending
for services within the health or HIV boundaries, and do not
consider how spending in other sectors that also inﬂuence health or
HIV may contribute to effective ﬁnancing of the HIV response.
Finally, most estimates of domestic ﬁnancing for HIV to date have
used normative targets in areas such as allocations to the health
sector and general revenue generation capacity, assuming that
these norms can be reached (Resch et al., 2015), although there is
one previous study that examines whether countries can achieve
levels of spending observed among their peers (Galarraga et al.,
2013), but does not examine whether these levels are optimal.
Focusing on the 14 most HIV-affected countries in SSA, this
paper explores the potential to expand domestic ﬁnancing for HIV
from a comprehensive range of domestic sources, including general
health and cross-sectoral ﬁnancing streams. We examine the
ﬁnancing system as a whole, incorporating changes in efﬁciency of
spending, as well as revenue-raising. We use two approaches: one
focused on achieving a range of ﬁnancing targets - our ‘normative’
approach; and the other that incorporates previous ﬁscal behav-
iours, to try to incorporate the ‘real world’ constraints on domestic
ﬁnancing. For the latter, we examine historical ﬁscal data to explore
howmuch changes in key characteristics of domestic public ﬁnance
(such as proportional spend on health care) have led to changes in
HIV expenditure. In doing so, we aim to demonstrate a compre-
hensive empirical approach to estimating the available domestic
ﬁnancing for HIV, and provoke discussion on the appropriate policy
response and allocation of international ﬁnancing for the HIV
response in the coming years.
2. Methods
We applied the concept of ‘ﬁscal space’ to explore how much
additional public ﬁnancing could be made available for HIV in the
next 5 years, in the 14 sub-Saharan African countries with the
largest HIV epidemics and expected ﬁscal burdens (Lule and
Haacker, 2012; UNAIDS, 2014b)e South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya,
Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia,
Ethiopia, Lesotho, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland. These include
the 10 countries with the most people living with HIV (PLHIV) and
all hyperendemic countries, with adult prevalence above 15%.
Together they account for 85% of the disease burden in the region,
in terms of number of PLHIV (UNAIDS, 2014b). Our analysis focused
on the medium-term, i.e. the next 5 years, given the uncertainty
around the macroeconomic and political context in the longer run,
but we discuss the implications for addressing the substantial
economic challenge of HIV ﬁnancing in the coming decades.
In public ﬁnance, ‘ﬁscal space’ is used to describe the budgetary
space available to allocate public resources to a speciﬁc objective,
without damaging other developmental or macroeconomic objec-
tives (Roy and Heuty, 2009; World Bank and IMF, 2006), including
ﬁscal sustainability. The potential sources of ﬁscal space for HIV are
similar to those for health services generally, but may vary across
countries. Theoretically, domestic sources include: (1) conducive
macroeconomic conditions through economic growth, (2)
improved taxation/revenue generation, (3) borrowing, (4) repri-
oritisation (within the government or health budget), (5) sector-
speciﬁc earmarked sources of revenue, and (6) efﬁciency gains
(Heller, 2006; Powell-Jackson et al., 2012; Tandon and Cashin,
2010). An additional external source is external grants.
To explore which ﬁnancing policy options have the most po-
tential to create ﬁscal space for HIV emeasured as increased public
HIV spending e we followed two approaches. The ﬁrst ‘extended
normative’ approach considers what countries could be spending,
given their ﬁscal position, health system and epidemic context. We
estimated how much ﬁscal space could be created for HIV in a
speciﬁc country by reaching a normative target or benchmark,
using a comprehensive set of ﬁscal space sources, and holding all
other factors constant. For example, how much more could a
country spend on HIV if the health share in government spending
was increased to the so-called Abuja target of 15% that was agreed
upon in 2001, and HIV spending increased proportionately? These
estimates are likely to be optimistic and can be seen as representing
an upper bound estimate of ﬁscal space.
In the second approach, we seek to challenge these optimistic
estimates to reﬂect some of the uncertainty around the impact of
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each ﬁscal policy change on the ﬁscal space for HIV, by incorpo-
rating empirical evidence on how the different ﬁscal levers were
associated with public HIV expenditure in the past. This empirical
approach aims to explorewhich ﬁnancing options aremost likely to
translate into real increases in public HIV resources based on past
behaviours. To do this, we developed econometric models to test to
what extent variation in public HIV spending between countries
may be explained by variation in the different ﬁscal levers. This
second approach incorporates the possibility that changes in ﬁscal
indicators may not always ‘trickle-down’ to changes in public HIV
spending. For example, an increase in the share of health in the
national budget may result in a decrease in the relative share of HIV
in the heath budget, if policy makers are satisﬁed with levels of HIV
spending.
2.1. Data sources
We used publicly available data on the latest ﬁscal, macroeco-
nomic, epidemiological, expenditure and health system data
available between 2008 and 2012. A full description of all data
sources is contained in the Supplementary appendix. We analysed
the ﬁscal space implications for the 14 selected sub-Saharan African
countries, but for the empirical approach, we used a cross-sectional
dataset of 92 countries. Table 1 presents its summary statistics. We
did not impute missing values, potentially underestimating ﬁscal
space in certain countries, when country-speciﬁc data was not
available. All monetary ﬁgures are expressed in 2014 US$.
2.2. Extended normative approach
Our extended normative analysis considered how much addi-
tional resources could be generated if countries were to meet tar-
gets or benchmarks anchored in either ﬁscal capacity, minimum
standards or optimal targets. We drew on the framework of do-
mestic ﬁscal space sources above. In addition to forecasted eco-
nomic growth, government revenue generation, and the
prioritisation benchmarks used in a recent study (Resch et al.,
2015), we included borrowing and incorporated new norms for
the earmarked revenue category and efﬁciency gains. We used
norms set by global/regional agreements, governing bodies or in-
stitutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Where
these were not available, we developed norms based on optimal
levels from other countries as described below. All ﬁnancing
sources and measures are summarised in Table 2.
Compared to previous normative analyses (David, 2009; Resch
et al., 2015; van der Gaag et al., 2009), we included three addi-
tional components of ﬁscal space. First, we attempted to quantify
the potential ﬁscal space from health-earmarked revenue sources,
using the example of social health insurance. To estimate how
much ﬁscal space may be generated from such a scheme, we
assumed current out-of-pocket expenditures in excess of the WHO
acceptable level of 20% of total health expenditure spent in the
private sector, could be converted into social health insurance
premia that would ﬂow to the government health budget and be
used for strategic purchasing (Kutzin, 2013). We also examined the
ﬁscal space generated by an increased excise tax on alcohol (beer
speciﬁcally), whereby the net additional revenue from increasing
the tax from its current level to the West African Economic and
Monetary Union's threshold of 50% (Mansour and Graziosi, 2013)
could be allocated to health, and proportionately to HIV.
Second, we constructed a simple measure of technical efﬁciency
using the ratio of non-drug expenditures per person retained on
ART to GDP per capita, and identiﬁed the best performing country
among the 14 countries per income category (low-income, lower-
middle-income, upper-middle-income). We then estimated loga-
rithmic functions for each income category based on these best
performers and the ﬁnding from a cross-country empirical analysis
of ART unit costs that found that a doubling in per-capita GDP was
associated with a 22% increase in non-drug ART unit costs (Menzies
et al., 2012). These function served as an efﬁciency frontier to es-
timate each country's potential non-drug ART unit cost given its
GDP per capita, and how much ﬁscal space would be generated if
each country reached that benchmark in their HIV programme,
thereby freeing up further resources to spend on HIV services. It is
worth pointing out that we did not ﬁnd an adequate cross-country
measure of allocative efﬁciency between HIV programme areas,
while this may be a key source of efﬁciency gains.
Finally, while previous analyses have implicitly assumed that
less prioritisation of the HIV programme would reduce ﬁscal space
for HIV improvement (David, 2009; Resch et al., 2015), we explored
the potential HIV gains from reprioritisation towards investments
in other areas of spending (either in health systems, or in other
sectors) that have been shown to improve HIV outcomes. To illus-
trate this potential, we used an exploratory cross-sectional econo-
metric model for Prevention of Mother-to-Child HIV Transmission
(PMTCT) screening (see appendix S12), which examines how much
higher PMTCT screening coverage could be achieved if countries
achieved the WHO minimum norm of having 2.3 health workers
per 1000 population.We then estimated howmuchmore a country
would have had to spend in total on HIV to achieve that same in-
crease. We applied that percentage increase to the public HIV
spending ﬁgure, as ameasure of potential savings to the HIV budget
from investments by other budgets. Put differently, by using the
effects of human resource inputs and ﬁnancial inputs on service
coverage, we were able to calculate the monetary valuation of the
effect of increasing the number of health workers to the norm, from
the HIV budget holder's perspective. To illustrate the same poten-
tial for interventions outside the health sector (Seeley et al., 2012),
we took the example of how a reduction in undernourishment to
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target, could improve
Table 1
Summary statistics of the variables in the regression analyses.
Variable n Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Public HIV spending per PLHIV (US$) 92 347 565 2 3191
GDP per capita (US$) 92 3225 3173 239 11,695
Adult HIV prevalence (%) 92 3% 5% 0% 27%
Control of corruption indexa 92 4.36 0.51 3.54 5.94
International HIV spending per PLHIV (US$) 92 419 457 1 2137
Government revenue, excluding grants (% of GDP) 92 23% 9% 10% 57%
Gross Government Debt (% of GDP) 87 41% 23% 9% 143%
Government Health Expenditure (% of Government Expenditure) 91 11% 5% 2% 28%
Out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita (US$) 90 68 76 2 382
Non-drug cost per person retained on antiretroviral treatment (US$) 86 1152 1349 37 6793
Public HIV Spending (% of Government Health Expenditure) 92 3% 8% 0% 69%
a This Worldwide Governance Indicator is rescaled to range from 2.5 to 7.5.
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HIV service coverage e again using PMTCT screening coverage e
and therefore free up space in the HIV budget (Remme et al., 2014).
2.3. Empirical approach
To examine how domestic HIV spending in low and middle-
income countries was associated with movements in different ﬁs-
cal levers in the past, we constructed separate econometric
regression models for each ﬁscal space source used in the extended
normative approach, except the non-HIV efﬁciency sources that
were estimated for illustrative purposes from a separate model
described in the appendix.
Each of the regression models are speciﬁed as follows:
Yj ¼ qiCij þ bxþ εj (1)
where Yj, the dependent variable, is public HIV spending per person
living with HIV (PLHIV) in country j; Cij is a vector of covariates ci
with qi vector of mean coefﬁcients; x is each explanatory variable
(or ﬁscal space source) with b its mean coefﬁcient; and εi is an error
term. The dependent variable and independent variables with
monetary values or proportions were transformed into natural
logarithmic form, implying that the coefﬁcients of the independent
variables can be interpreted as elasticities, or measures of respon-
siveness (Gerdtham et al., 1992).
Covariates were selected based on a previous study investi-
gating the determinants of domestic HIV spending (Avila et al.,
2013). These include disease burden (HIV prevalence), quality of
governance (control of corruption), and national income level (GDP
per capita). In addition, we include international HIV spending per
PLHIV as a covariate, given the potential interaction and fungibility
with public spending, as documented in the health expenditure
literature (Lu et al., 2010). The year of the spending data was added
as a time trend variable for the independent effect of changes in
technology, medical practices and cost pressures (Fan and Savedoff,
2014). Finally, we included regional dummies to account for qual-
itative differences between UNAIDS regions.
We speciﬁed seven different models. In the ﬁrst model, we
included all the aforementioned covariates and the ﬁrst theoretical
source of ﬁscal space: economic growth, proxied by GDP per capita
as the independent explanatory variable. In the seven successive
models, we kept GDP per capita as a covariate and added variables
for each theoretical source of ﬁscal space one by one (models 2 to
8). Wewould expect public HIV spending per PLHIV to be positively
associated with GDP per capita, government revenue, government
health and HIV prioritisation (David, 2009; Heller, 2006; Resch
et al., 2015); but negatively associated with out-of-pocket health
expenditures per capita (the inverse of the extent of risk pooling)
(Fan and Savedoff, 2014). The relationship with government debt
could be either positive or negative, depending on whether addi-
tional borrowing frees up other government resources for the HIV
programme (David, 2009; Elovainio and Evans, 2013). The rela-
tionship with the measure for technical efﬁciency (the non-drug
cost per person retained on ART) is particularly ambiguous, as it
Table 2
Fiscal space framework and measures used per source.
Source Indicator Modelled target HIV adjustment
Economic growth GDP, constant $
(IMF)
Average forecasted annual growth (2014e2018)
Improved government
revenue generation
Government revenue,
excluding grants, as % of GDP
(World Bank)
25%
(McIntyre and Meheus, 2014)
Reprioritisation
e of Health
General government health
expenditure as % of Total
government expenditure
(WHO)
15%
(Abuja target)
e of HIV
Public HIV spending as % of
Government health
expenditure
(UNAIDS, WHO)
0.5  HIV DALYs as % of total DALYs
(IHME, 2010 Global Burden of Disease data)
Government
borrowing
Gross debt as % of GDP
(IMF)
40%
(IMF ‘sound’ level)
Health-earmarked
resources
e Risk pooling
mechanisms
Reduced out-of-pocket health
expenditure per capita through
contributory pooling
mechanism
(WHO)
20%
(WHO acceptable level)
50% of spending in excess of threshold converted from
private sector to government health resources; minus
risk-pooling mechanism administration cost (of US$
1.77 per capita) then apportioned to HIV based on
current ratio of total HIV spending to total health
spending
e Innovative domestic
ﬁnancing
Increased revenues from
increase in excise tax on
alcohol (beer)
(WHO)
50%
(West African Economic and Monetary Union threshold)
Minus reduction in sales due to tax assuming 0.3 price
elasticity deducted from total revenue; then
apportioned as above
Efﬁciency gains
e Treatment & care
programme
technical efﬁciency
Ratio of Non-drug treatment
spending per person retained
on ART to GDP per capita
(UNAIDS)
Non-drug unit cost estimated from logarithmic
production possibility frontier derived from most
‘efﬁcient’ country with the minimum ratio by income
group:16% (Zimbabwe) for LICs; 9% (Zambia) in LMICs;
15% (Botswana) in UMICs
Number of people receiving antiretroviral drugs (ARVs)
adjusted by 12 month retention rate;
Share of savings in total HIV treatment and care
spending then applied to public HIV spending
e Health system
technical efﬁciency
gains for the PMTCT
programme
Aggregate health personnel
density
(WHO)
2.3 per 1000 population
(WHO minimum level)
Regression model of PMTCT screening coverage, with
Nurse density, Proportion of undernourished in total
population, HIV prevalence, GDP per capita, Total HIV
spending per PLHIV, Adult female literacy, Urbanisation
rate
(see Appendix for details)e Non-health sector
efﬁciency gains for
the PMTCT
programme
Proportion of undernourished
People in the total population
(FAO)
11.7%
(MDG1 target of halving 1990 level of 23.4% in developing
countries)
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will depend on whether a more efﬁcient ART programme attracts
more government resources or less.
We used ordinary least squares estimation and performed
standard diagnostic tests to validate the underlying assumptions.
To explore the sensitivity of the ﬁndings and obtain additional in-
sights into the variability of the effects, we used two additional
estimation methods: quantile regression and neighbour matching
ﬁxed effects (Colombo et al., 2014). The former is less sensitive to
outliers and accommodates for the effects of the independent
variables to vary over quantiles of the dependent variable. Indeed, it
is likely that public HIV spending is more or less responsive to
changes in ﬁscal policy at different levels of spending. In addition, it
is possible that our models omit important variables (observable or
unobservable) that are driving both ﬁscal policies and public HIV
spending. For example, certain dimensions of governance may not
be sufﬁciently captured in our measures. To take this possibility
into account, we applied neighbour ﬁxed effects modelling
(Colombo et al., 2014), which involves a matching exercise between
neighbouring countries aimed at controlling for unobserved char-
acteristics that are similar between neighbouring countries (see
appendix 4.2.3).
2.4. Comparing the two approaches
We compared the cumulative maximum public HIV spending
per PLHIV under the ﬁrst approach where all normative targets are
met, to an empirical scenario based on past government respon-
siveness to changes in each ﬁscal lever using the coefﬁcients (or
elasticities) from the OLS models for each statistically signiﬁcant
source of ﬁnancing. Finally, we estimated the ﬁnancing gap by
comparing both estimates to the average annual ﬁscal cost of
delivering HIV services over the same period in a continued scale-
up scenario, as modelled in a recent analysis (Hontelez et al., 2016).
3. Results
As presented in Table 3, annual public HIV spending in the 14
countries is currently estimated at US$3.04 billion. Using the
extended normative approach, we estimated that in the next ﬁve
years an additional US$120 million could be generated per year
from economic growth, US$79 million from improved revenue
generation, US$888 million from borrowing, US$1.05 billion from
increased health prioritisation, US$1.68 billion from greater HIV
prioritisation, US$275 million from pooling out-of-pocket expen-
ditures, US$171 million from increased alcohol taxation, and
US$937 million from efﬁciency gains in the public HIV programme
based on ART service efﬁciencies. Cumulatively, if all these ﬁscal
levers were simultaneously leveraged, public HIV spending could
reach US$10.84 billion per year. In addition, investments in the
health system to increase human resources to the recommended
minimum would reduce the need for additional direct HIV expen-
ditures of US$418 million; while investments to reduce malnutri-
tion could further save US$653 million of direct HIV investment
(see appendix S13-15).
The largest sources of ﬁscal space varied considerably between
countries and income categories. For our selected low-income
countries, a greater prioritisation of HIV in the health budget
could mobilise substantial resources. For the lower-middle-income
countries, a greater prioritisation of health in the national budget
had the greatest potential in the medium-term. The next best op-
tionwas borrowing, which was largely driven by Nigeria's low debt
ratio. For the upper-middle-income countries, greater HIV priori-
tisation in the health budget and savings following a more efﬁcient
delivery of ART services were the top source of ﬁscal space. Within
the ﬁve-year period, economic growth and better revenue
generation would provide comparatively fewer resources across all
countries. Interestingly, the potential HIV budget savings from non-
HIV investments compared favourably with other sources, espe-
cially in low-income countries.
There was substantial variation in both ﬁscal space and the
number of ﬁscal levers available across countries. For example,
Lesotho and Malawi have few options to create substantial ﬁscal
space, whereas Nigeria could capitalise on several options that
could independently double its current expenditure.
The empiricalmodels in Table 4 showhowmuch ﬁscal spacewas
generated for HIV in the past from changes in each ﬁscal lever. They
indicate that the assumption that other ﬁscal levers remain unaf-
fected when one ﬁscal lever is changed may overestimate the po-
tential for additional ﬁnancing. Our analysis of the determinants of
past spending suggested that only higher GDP per capita (economic
growth) may have led to a more than proportionate increase in
public HIV spending, as a 1% increase in GDP per capita was associ-
atedwith 1.09% increase in public HIV spending (model 1). Thismay
indicate thatHIV serviceswereviewed in economic termsas ‘luxury’
services,which received larger shares of income as income grew - or
were ‘income elastic’. However, since this coefﬁcient is not signiﬁ-
cantly greater than 1 (ranging from 0.94 to 1.24), public HIV
spending could also have received a smaller or equal share of na-
tional incomeas it increased). Theneighbourpairﬁxedeffectsmodel
presented in Table 5, found a higher and more robust income elas-
ticity (1.25), while the quantile regressions suggested more
responsiveness among the lower spenders (typically the lower-
incomecountries) and less among thebigger spenders (1.21 vs0.75).
Conversely, countries with a 1% higher prioritisation of health in
the national budget only spent 0.40% more on HIV, indicating that
countries spent disproportionately less of their larger health budget
on HIV services. The bigger spenders (75th percentile) were more
responsive to this lever, while the lower spenders might not have
been (Table 5). Looking more closely at the determinants of HIV
prioritisation, we found that countries with a 1% higher health
share in the government budget, allocated 0.74% less to HIV from
the health budget (appendix S11). This suggested that countries
that prioritised HIV more, did so despite or in compensation of
lower government health spending. Model 7 in Table 4 seems to
further corroborate this, as even a 1% increase in the share of HIV in
the health budget was only associated with a 0.76% increase in HIV
spending. This low level of responsiveness, or ‘inelasticity’, is robust
to all estimation methods (Table 5).
Other ﬁscal levers did not seem to have had an impact on HIV
expenditures to date according to the OLS estimation, but their
signs were consistent with our expectations and all coefﬁcients
suggested an inelastic relationship (<1). The models had relatively
high explanatory power, and the diagnostic tests did not indicate
concerns around model speciﬁcation or omitted variables.
That being said, we gained further insights from the alternative
estimation methods we used to explore what these results were
sensitive to. For example, another noteworthy difference is that
after adjusting for unobserved characteristics that are similar
among neighbouring countries, improved government revenue
generation appeared to be signiﬁcantly associated with public HIV
spending, while health prioritisation was not. This suggests that
governments that were better at collecting revenue were also more
consistently able and willing to spend those resources on HIV.
Another ﬁnding worth highlighting is the repeatedly signiﬁcant
positive relationship between countries' levels of public and in-
ternational HIV spending. A 10% increase in international spending
was associated with a signiﬁcant 1.0%e4.0% increase in public HIV
spending (Table 4). This may be linked to its signiﬁcant positive
relationship with government's prioritisation of HIV in the health
budget (appendix S11).
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Table 3
Potential medium-term sources of domestic ﬁnancing (US$) in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa based on the expanded normative approach.
Current public HIV
spending (US$)
Average additional public HIV spending (2014e2018 annualised, US$) Maximum potential public
HIV spending (US$)
Average HIV savings from non-
HIV spending (2014e18,
annualized, US$)
Economic
growth
Govt revenue
generation
External
borrowing
Reprioritisation Health-earmarked sources Technical
efﬁciency gains
Health HIV Health risk-
pooling
mechanism
Alcohol tax Reduced ART non-
drug unit cost
Expansion
of HRH
Reduced
undernourishment
Low-income countries
Ethiopia 29,873,725 2,483,346 23,472,213 23,914,041 10,502,582 0 1,676,226 0 18,799,533 218,672,382 109,013,328 31,722,582
Malawi 2,076,376 148,797 0 0 0 28,452,963 0 11,280,604 0 48,099,500 5,917,374 1,046,868
Mozambique 13,833,586 1,286,161 1,009,317 0 9,729,293 39,293,813 0 n.a. 7,267,865 163,100,675 35,106,269 15,879,784
Uganda 42,372,003 3,376,698 36,680,242 4,424,621 19,824,309 0 44,342,876 0 34,919,679 226,770,473 26,116,695 47,835,568
Tanzania 7,292,938 598,900 3,175,056 0 3,433,372 70,781,762 5,357,016 n.a. 5,169,052 253,765,981 35,412,688 7,963,036
Zimbabwe 35,710,509 1,685,083 0 0 n.a. 10,623,961 n.a n.a. 0 52,795,374 18,938,406 31,647,486
Lower-middle-income countries
Kenya 144,603,851 10,477,064 11,219,264 0 226,129,240 0 89,037,711 n.a. 92,154,809 674,250,737 152,310,361 116,208,273
Lesotho 50,694,268 3,057,221 0 0 1,817,686 0 0 n.a. 40,404,416 102,101,635 n.a. n.a.
Nigeria 123,946,158 9,819,442 0 213,804,800 155,173,666 67,048,691 134,816,685 41,181,447 61,196,796 1,678,586,031 16,288,281 0
Swaziland 32,128,818 693,315 0 26,178,551 0 16,889,249 0 4,064,522 15,356,386 114,058,678 n.a. n.a.
Zambia 16,350,025 1,278,110 3,114,290 7,027,191 0 68,248,827 0 n.a. 0 217,804,380 18,567,945 22,079,281
Upper-middle-income countries
Botswana 315,948,052 14,128,478 0 527,198,394 273,135,411 0 0 14,386,505 0 1,779,276,710 0 216,418,647
Namibia 181,203,580 8,983,056 0 85,723,694 14,961,072 0 0 n.a. 31,841,130 362,037,531 0 161,999,829
South Africa 2,040,790,395 61,494,978 0 0 337,351,516 1,378,692,629 0 99,860,577 629,861,977 4,953,607,750 0 0
Total LICs 131,159,138 9,578,984 64,336,828 28,338,662 43,489,557 149,152,499 51,376,118 11,280,604 66,156,129 963,204,386 230,504,760 136,095,325
Total LMICs 367,723,120 25,325,153 14,333,555 247,010,542 383,120,593 152,186,768 223,854,396 45,245,969 209,112,407 2,786,801,461 187,166,586 138,287,554
Total UMICs 2,537,942,027 84,606,512 0 612,922,088 625,447,998 1,378,692,629 0 114,247,082 661,703,107 7,094,921,991 0 378,418,477
Total 3,036,824,285 119,510,649 78,670,382 888,271,292 1,052,058,148 1,680,031,895 275,230,514 170,773,654 936,971,643 10,844,927,838 417,671,345 652,801,356
Note: All monetary ﬁgures are in 2014US$. Maximumpotential public spending is a cumulative value if all the sources are increased simultaneously, which is why it is more than the sum of each source. To avoid double-counting,
where revenue generation was increased to the norm and health reprioritised, we did not include the additional health-earmarked sources in this cumulative sum.
LICs: Low-income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle-income countries.
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Table 4
Regression analyses (OLS) of Public HIV spending per PLHIV (US$) by source of ﬁscal space.
Ordinary least squares regression Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Control variables
HIV prevalence 0.172
(0.123)
0.221*
(0.128)
0.191
(0.126)
0.181
(0.124)
0.158
(0.127)
0.254**
(0.124)
0.782***
(0.084)
Control of corruption index 0.240
(0.250)
0.245
(0.249)
0.186
(0.263)
0.077
(0.265)
0.224
(0.255)
0.512**
(0.249)
0.282**
(0.142)
International HIV spending per PLHIV 0.212**
(0.094)
0.214**
(0.093)
0.198**
(0.097)
0.190**
(0.093)
0.202**
(0.095)
0.132
(0.094)
0.101*
(0.054)
Year of spending data 0.036
(0.087)
0.050
(0.088)
0.059
(0.088)
0.064
(0.087)
0.045
(0.090)
0.028
(0.084)
0.036
(0.050)
Reference: West & Central Africa
East & Southern Africa 0.328
(0.354)
0.375
(0.355)
0.484
(0.366)
0.396
(0.353)
0.286
(0.372)
0.185
(0.333)
0.108
(0.202)
Asia & Paciﬁc region 0.019
(0.403)
0.088
(0.406)
0.108
(0.408)
0.026
(0.399)
0.034
(0.415)
0.156
(0.387)
0.040
(0.229)
Latin America region 1.310***
(0.428)
1.309***
(0.427)
1.350***
(0.425)
1.135***
(0.446)
1.374***
(0.438)
1.017**
(0.429)
0.708***
(0.247)
Caribbean region 0.359
(0.543)
0.328
(0.541)
0.243
(0.543)
0.353
(0.537)
0.368
(0.562)
0.473
(0.503)
0.123
(0.308)
Easter Europe & Central Asia region 0.687
(0.485)
0.521
(0.500)
0.663
(0.485)
0.706
(0.481)
0.764
(0.495)
0.408
(0.468)
0.345
(0.276)
North Africa & Middle East Region 0.586
(0.539)
0.715
(0.547)
0.245
(0.559)
0.575
(0.536)
0.493
(0.553)
0.524
(0.551)
0.148
(0.311)
Sources of ﬁscal space (explanatory variables)
GDP per capita 1.091***
(0.153)
1.007***
(0.166)
1.050***
(0.157)
1.116***
(0.153)
1.137***
(0.216)
1.017***
(0.149)
0.994***
(0.087)
Government revenue, excl. grants as % GDP 0.443
(0.350)
Gross government debt as % GDP 0.162
(0.207)
Government health expenditure as % total government expenditure 0.400*
(0.251)
Out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita 0.071
(0.181)
Non-drug cost per person on ART 0.105
(0.118)
Public HIV spending as % of government health expenditure 0.757***
(0.058)
Constant 78.508
(175.606)
107.211
(176.421)
124.623
(176.942)
134.622
(175.506)
97.565
(180.588)
64.140
(168.128)
68.346
(100.270)
Observations 92 92 87 91 90 86 92
R2 0.733 0.739 0.743 0.743 0.733 0.785 0.915
For the regressions the dependent variable and independent variables with monetary values or proportions were transformed into natural logarithmic form. The numbers in
the cells are regression coefﬁcients (standard errors). Signiﬁcance levels are denoted as * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, *** for p < 0.01.
Each model tests the relationship with a different ﬁscal lever: (1) economic growth; (2) general revenue generation; (3) borrowing; (4) health prioritisation; (5) earmarked
health revenue through risk-pooling scheme; (6) technical efﬁciency gains in the HIV programme based on ART programme efﬁciency; (7) HIV prioritisation in health.
Table 5
Relationship between Public HIV spending per PLHIV and each ﬁscal lever with different estimation methods.
Fiscal space policy options OLS Quantile regressions Neighbour (hood) models
25th
percentile
50th
percentile
75th
percentile
Pair FE Random pair FE Neighbour-hood
FE
GDP per capita 1.091***
(0.153)
1.207***
(0.290)
1.102***
(0.183)
0.754***
(0.172)
1.168***
(0.174)
1.190***
(0.170)
1.246***
(0.150)
Government revenue, excl. grants as % GDP 0.443
(0.350)
0.312
(0.677)
0.242
(0.452)
0.486
(0.411)
0.850**
(0.421)
0.845**
(0.355)
0.825**
(0.395)
Gross government debt as % GDP 0.162
(0.207)
0.065
(0.301)
0.022
(0.358)
0.074
(0.436)
0.0758
(0.194)
0.00471
(0.162)
0.145
(0.182)
Government Health Expenditure as % Government
Expenditure
0.400*
(0.251)
0.189
(0.466)
0.419***
(0.337)
0.675***
(0.223)
0.199
(0.206)
0.284
(0.222)
0.229
(0.197)
Out-of-pocket health expenditure per capita 0.071
(0.181)
0.002
(0.332)
0.035
(0.220)
0.144
(0.197)
0.157
(0.165)
0.107
(0.159)
0.107
(0.168)
Non-drug cost per person on ART 0.105
(0.118)
0.045
(0.165)
0.024
(0.166)
0.146
(0.127)
0.182
(0.127)
0.124
(0.108)
0.233**
(0.116)
Public HIV spending as % of GHE 0.757***
(0.058)
0.851***
(0.068)
0.783***
(0.074)
0.812***
(0.088)
0.715***
(0.111)
0.688***
(0.117)
0.758***
(0.0767)
The numbers in the cells are regression coefﬁcients (standard errors). Signiﬁcance levels are denoted as * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, *** for p < 0.01.
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If past behaviours of low and middle-income countries continue
into the future, we found that ﬁscal space may only be realistically
created from economic growth, greater health or HIV prioritisation.
For these prioritisation measures, the resulting increase in public
HIV expenditure would be less than has been assumed, and a larger
share of health in the national budget and of HIV in the health
budget have not been achieved simultaneously. Comparing the
maximum annual ﬁscal space estimates under the normative
approach to the ﬁscal space estimates based on the responsiveness
found in the OLS models, with only GDP per capita, health and HIV
prioritisation being brought up to their forecasted levels or targets,
we ﬁnd between 4% and 80% less potential public ﬁnance in the
selected countries (median 57% less) (see Fig. 1).
When comparing both the normative and empirical estimates of
ﬁscal space for HIV to the ﬁscal needs, we found that Malawi,
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia
would not be able to fund their HIV programmes in either scenario.
On the other hand, under the normative approach, Kenya, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, and Swaziland could cover this cost in principle, but not
under the empirical approach. In this case, only South Africa,
Botswana and Namibia could meet this ﬁscal need under both
scenarios.
4. Discussion
Our analysis suggests that the most HIV-affected lower-income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa will not be able to generate sufﬁ-
cient domestic public resources in the medium-term, even if they
take very bold measures to improve revenue generation, reallocate
resources and maximise efﬁciency in line with their economic ca-
pacity. The shortfall between the optimistic normative estimate of
potential ﬁnancing and recent conservative estimates of ﬁnancial
obligations (with continued scale-up) remains considerable
(Hontelez et al., 2016). Some of the lower-middle income countries
could cover these costs in principle if they would adopt normative
targets and tap more innovative ﬁscal levers. However, when past
HIV ﬁnancing behaviour (which may be rational) is taken into
account, even they could not pay for their HIV programmes. Only
the upper-middle income countries could potentially shoulder the
ﬁscal costs of their responses in the near future. Our ﬁndings
therefore support the broad global policy response to increasingly
target international ﬁnancing.
Our normative estimates of ﬁscal space are substantially higher
than previous studies, because we include a more comprehensive
(but still non-exhaustive) set of ﬁscal policy options, including
some unconventional ones. This provides an optimistic picture,
with signiﬁcant effort required to realise some of this potential. We
consider borrowing as a serious policy option; unpack and quantify
some health-earmarked sources; as well as efﬁciency gains from
within and beyond the HIV programme.When comparing the same
sources, we generally ﬁnd similar potential as the most recent
study by Resch et al. (2015), although our estimates of ﬁscal space
from economic growth and general revenue generation tend to be
somewhat lower, possibly due to differences in data sources.
When we constrain our estimates by the empirical models of
which levers have been related to public HIV spending in the past,
they become lower than previous estimates. This approach high-
lights that achieving various norms/benchmarks is not likely to
automatically translate into a real proportionate increase in HIV
spending; in part due to the interaction between different ﬁscal
policies. Therefore, focusing on reprioritising resources towards
HIV and/or health alone, based on targets that have already proven
to be politically challenging e may end up yielding less additional
ﬁnance than anticipated.
It should be noted that our ﬁndings have several limitations.
First, the quality of HIV spending data is weak. They may partly
reﬂect spending where government is the agent rather than the
source; capture disbursements rather than expenditures; and
identify only HIV-labelled expenditures rather than overall ex-
penditures for HIV. Secondly, we implicitly assume an immediate
policy decision, no transaction costs and the absorptive capacity to
implement ﬁscal targets (David, 2009). This is unlikely, particularly
in areas like converting out-of-pocket expenditures into social
health insurance premia, and hence we may overestimate the
Fig. 1. Comparing the potential ﬁscal space for HIV from the extended normative approach to the empirical approach.
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short-term potential from these sources. Similarly, although our
empirical analysis was designed to incorporate the uncertainty
around adjustments between ﬁscal policies, we have not incorpo-
rated the uncertainty around the feasibility of achieving each norm.
Some of the ‘global’ norms we used are quite conservative, such as
economic growth and government revenue generation (McIntyre
and Meheus, 2014), whereas others are considerably more opti-
mistic, like the Abuja target, or the share of out-of-pocket expen-
ditures in total health expenditures. Still, there are countries among
the 14 that achieved or surpassed each one of them.
A third limitation stems from relying on global analyses to draw
conclusions for the sub-Saharan African sub-group, and past
spending data to predict future spending. Indeed, it is reasonable to
expect that the 14 most HIV-affected countries are qualitatively
different from other low and middle-income countries, just as
governments may make decisions differently going forward,
especially if donors start changing their ﬁnancing patterns
(Dieleman et al., 2014; Kates et al., 2014).
Finally, an important limitation in our empirical models is a
potential endogeneity bias from our cross-sectional dataset.
Although we used similar methods adopted in previous studies on
the determinants of HIV and health expenditures (Avila et al., 2013;
Fan and Savedoff, 2014; Gerdtham et al., 1992; Xu et al., 2011)-
albeit for panel datasets - there is a risk when making causal in-
ferences. We applied the neighbour ﬁxed effects approach
(Colombo et al., 2014) to address the potential omitted variable
bias, but neither estimation method addresses the potential bi-
directionality between certain explanatory variables and public
HIV spending. We considered this bias for each of the variables of
interest. Where they may inﬂuence our estimates, it is likely to be
by attenuating the impact of ﬁscal adjustments and overestimating
coefﬁcients. This would imply that our adjusted ‘real world’ esti-
mates are still overestimates of the real ﬁscal policy effect on pubic
HIV spending, but they would be closer than current normative
estimates. The only exception would be GDP per capita, where we
ﬁnd greater responsiveness, but existing evidence does not support
suchmacroeconomic impacts of HIV (Beegle and DeWeerdt, 2008),
even in high burden countries. The other variables of interest with a
more important potential bidirectionality bias that could affect our
ﬁndings are out-of-pocket health expenditures and the non-drug
cost per person retained on ART. For both measures, the insigniﬁ-
cant relationships we found do not rule out the existence of a
relationship in either direction, and their exclusion from the
empirical estimates may underestimate their potential.
Despite these limitations, our ﬁndings have some clear speciﬁc
policy implications. Our empirical analysis suggests that govern-
ments have not usedmany of their domestic ﬁscal levers to increase
HIV allocations. Country-level consultations indicate that domestic
resource mobilisation has not been a priority in certain countries,
given the availability of large external HIV funds and varying per-
ceptions as to their likely decline (Katz et al., 2014a). This could
further explain why increasing the tax base was not consistently
associated with past public HIV spending, as external HIV ﬁnancing
may have been easier for governments to mobilise.
Only economic growth, health and HIV prioritisation appear to
have consistently inﬂuenced national levels of HIV expenditure.
Strong economic growth in Africa is being hailed as a major source
of domestic ﬁnancing, but although we ﬁnd that public HIV
spending is very responsive to income (similarly to health expen-
diture (Fan and Savedoff, 2014; Xu et al., 2011)), the magnitude of
the increase from this source alone is relatively small in the
medium-term (Elovainio and Evans, 2013). Nonetheless, it repre-
sents a relatively reliable source that could sustain andmultiply the
impact of other measures in the long run. With strong political will,
it may also be usedmore proactively to ring-fence resources for HIV
services through a more than proportionate allocation formula,
where desirable.
Countries could generate signiﬁcant resources by reprioritising
health in the general budget and HIV in the health budget (Resch
et al., 2015), even though their independent and joint potential
may have been overestimated to date (Tandon et al., 2014). More-
over, greater HIV reprioritisation could risk crowding out other
areas of health investment (McIntyre and Meheus, 2014), although
the evidence on this is mixed (Samb et al., 2009). It may be
particularly difﬁcult to further prioritise HIV in contexts where
external ﬁnancing is declining, without a simultaneous increase in
other ﬁscal space sources, as our empirical models suggest that
international ﬁnancing for HIV may have indirectly contributed to
greater HIV prioritisation in health, through some crowding-in ef-
fect. This contrasts with previous studies that ﬁnd evidence of
fungibility in the health sector more generally, whereby increases
in development assistance for health channelled through govern-
ments have been associated with reductions in public spending on
health from public sources (Harper, 2012; Lu et al., 2010; Xu et al.,
2011). Even though it suggests care has to be taken to ensure
appropriate co-ﬁnancing arrangements, this could bode well for
future agreements between governments and donors, such as the
Global Fund's counterpart ﬁnancing requirements or the PEPFAR
partnership frameworks. However, there may be external expla-
nations for this ﬁnding. Alternative interpretations include that
much of HIV-related aid may have been channelled to NGOs and
therefore not displaced government spending (Lu et al., 2010); or
aid may be given to countries that already prioritise HIV more and
have better governance, as we ﬁnd in our analysis. This may also be
a measurement error, where some reported public spending may
include external aid channelled through government budgets.
In terms of the new areas of ﬁnancing identiﬁed, our analysis
suggests that several are worth further exploration. Concessional
borrowing has potential in principle, assuming the returns to these
investments outweigh the costs of borrowing. Yet, this has not been
a politically attractive option for direct HIV spending or for freeing
up government resources. This could have several reasons,
including that governments may not view HIV spending as an in-
vestment with ﬁnancial returns, despite the 15:1 return estimated
by UNAIDS (UNAIDS, 2014a). Moreover, this ability to borrow could
also be a reﬂection of recent debt relief in some countries resulting
in low debt stocks, rather than sound debt management. Yet, given
the magnitude of future HIV treatment obligations, the case could
potentially be made for more concessional HIV borrowing, espe-
cially in resource-rich countries (Ncube and Brixiova, 2013). Further
macroeconomic modelling is required to estimate the dynamic
feedback of HIV investments on ﬁscal space.
We also ﬁnd substantial potential from earmarked sources for
health, suggesting that those focusing on HIV have a strong mutual
interest with those working on general health sector ﬁnancing.
Converting high levels of out-of-pocket expenditure into stable and
non-regressive public revenue through social health insurance
could mobilise considerable resources for HIV, and other health
programmes, in Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, for example. But the
institutional reforms required would be substantial and time-
consuming. The government of Kenya has recognised this poten-
tial and decided to increase premia for the National Hospital In-
surance Fund by 25% to raise domestic resources for HIV and non-
communicable disease by a projected US$ 120 million over 5 years
(Katz et al., 2014a). This is considerably less than our estimated US$
89 million per year, but is likely a more realistic estimate of gradual
revenue generation through this mechanism. Earmarked increases
in alcohol taxes could also generate resources, in addition to their
expected double dividend of reducing HIV transmission and
improving treatment efﬁcacy (Hill and Sawyer, 2012; Vassall et al.,
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2012). Kenya and Benin have also considered HIV-earmarked taxes
on airline tickets and mobile phone usage, respectively (Katz et al.,
2014a). However, any earmarking may reduce ﬁscal ﬂexibility and
allocative efﬁciency in public ﬁnance more broadly (Kutzin, 2013;
Tandon et al., 2014); and may not be acceptable to ministries of
ﬁnance. Moreover, it is quite likely that increased revenues from
HIV-earmarked sources may in practice be accompanied by a
reduction in allocations from general government revenue to HIV
(McIntyre and Meheus, 2014; Tandon and Cashin, 2010; Tandon
et al., 2014). In the extreme case of Kazakhstan, for example,
following the introduction of a payroll tax earmarked for health, the
subsequent general tax allocation to health reduced by more than
the additional payroll tax, leading to a net reduction in health re-
sources (Elovainio and Evans, 2013). Such mechanisms therefore
might not generate any additional resources in the absence of
credible commitment mechanisms.
Our analysis conﬁrms the potential of technical efﬁciency gains;
and supports the global policy emphasis on improving HIV pro-
gramme efﬁciency for a sustained HIV response. Our estimates for
South Africa, for example, suggest that there could be more to gain
from the latter than from a greater prioritisation of health. How-
ever, the empirical data does not conﬁrm our input-oriented
measure of technical efﬁciency as a determinant of past public
HIV spending. This may be because higher unit costs can inﬂuence
spending in two opposite ways: by increasing spending to get the
same output, or decreasing government's willingness to allocate
resources to an inefﬁcient programme. Also, this measure does not
sufﬁciently capture price differentials or site-level heterogeneity.
Nonetheless, it was expected to broadly reﬂect in aggregate terms
the relative room for efﬁciency improvements, and interestingly,
our normative estimates of potential efﬁciency gains (29% of cur-
rent spending)e aremore conservative than recent estimates using
more sophisticated Data Envelopment Analysis techniques (53%)
(Zeng et al., 2012, 2016). Our results are sensitive to which country
is considered the best performer, particularly for the upper-middle-
income country category, which is not surprising given the large
unexplained variation in ART unit costs found in most empirical
studies (Siapka et al., 2014). Still, further research is needed to
develop country-level measures of programme efﬁciency and un-
derstand its determinants.
For low-income countries, we found substantial gains from
more effective complementary investments in health systems and
social development. In these highly resource-constrained settings,
the opportunity cost of increased HIV ﬁnancing may be particularly
high and synergistic investments all the more important. Our
ﬁndings cautiously suggest that the HIV budget holder could see
ﬁnancial value in contributing to human resource expansion or
reduced undernourishment, to avert direct HIV expenditures. This
does not necessarily mean that they should do so e the cost of this
investment would ﬁrst need to be determined and the net beneﬁt
of the investment established. Effective ﬁscal space would only be
created if the investment required was more efﬁcient than a direct
investment in HIV services. However, given that both these in-
vestments have wider beneﬁts than HIV alone, a co-ﬁnancing
approach that seeks to maximise HIV and other outcomes may be
considered (McIntyre andMeheus, 2014; Remme et al., 2014). Some
argue that the HIV sector has made only marginal short-term in-
vestments in health system complements that could be reaching
their limits (Bowser et al., 2014). It may be more rational for HIV
budget holders to consider co-investing in these binding con-
straints. However, more research is needed in this area to explore
which non-HIV investments could contribute most to the efﬁciency
of HIV programmes and what institutional mechanisms could
incentivise cross-sectoral and cross-disease governance and
ﬁnancing.
In conclusion, we present a more realistic, but still optimistic
picture of improved domestic ﬁnancing for HIV that will require the
HIV community to engage with broader public ﬁnance and social
development agendas. International funders can support this effort
with a more coherent engagement across health and social devel-
opment investments, a continued focus on efﬁciency, and a longer
term approach to co-ﬁnancing national HIV responses within
broader health ﬁnancing frameworks. With the ongoing dialogue
on how to ﬁnance the sustainable development goals, it will be
important that those working in HIV join the call for increased
health prioritisation in the context of universal health coverage,
and work to identify tailored country-speciﬁc approaches to pro-
actively leverage broader development investments. This will be
central to expanding access to HIV prevention and treatment in a
way that is sustainable and in line with the post-2015 development
agenda.
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